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S p e c i a l f e a t u r e "In public, India and China expressed undying friendship, but on the ground each was working to protect its strategic interests." (2) A fters three decades of "freeze" following the war between the two countries in November 1962, India and China resumed diplomatic and trade exchanges in the early 1990s.
(3) Almost 32 years passed between the official visit of Premier Zhou Enlai to India in 1956 (4) and that of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. Since the beginning of the current decade, bilateral diplomatic relations have improved dramatically, with each year seeing several visits by heads of government or state, as well as by ministers.
(5) During Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement entitled "strategic partnership for peace and prosperity." In 2006, the two sides marked "friendship year," and 2007 was declared "year of friendship through tourism." Exchanges of official visits led to diplomatic advances of a symbolic nature such as the reopening on 4 July 2006 of the Nathu La border pass between Sikkim and Tibet after 44 years of closure. Likewise in trade the two countries have experienced a substantial thaw, as bilateral commerce, which was negligible before 1991 ($260 million at best) is expected to reach $38 billion dollars 2008. (6) The contrast is arresting when one compares the period of tension and freeze that characterised Sino-Indian ties from the late 1950s with the multi-directional acceleration of official contacts since early this decade. While it's still too early to assess the real impact of this diplomatic warming, it's nevertheless interesting, given the growing weight of the two Asian giants on the world arena, to consider the nature and evolution of this bilateral relationship in the context of international relations and global trade. Have the two countries really buried the rivalry and mutual suspicion that stemmed from the 1962 military conflict? Are they embarking on a fraternal entente of the kind symbolised by the early 1950s slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (7) that was so dear to Nehru? More generally, could these warming diplomatic and trade relations give rise to a strategic partnership similar to that between the United States and Britain, or between post-World War II Germany and France, leading to the emergence of an Asian regional integrating force and a major axis in international relations? On the economic Emergence of a Pragmatic India-China Relationship B e t we e n G e os t ra t e g i c R iva l r y a n d E c o n o m i c C o m p e t i t i o n ( 1 ) JEAN-FRANÇOIS HUCHET plane, for instance, one analytical trend (encapsulated in the expression "Chindia" (8) )argues that the complementary character of the two economies -"workshop of the world" (China) and "the globe's back office" (India) -could boost their technological cooperation and build a strategic partnership, leading to a major overhaul of the regional and global economic scene. This article counsels caution with regard to media hyperbole as well as misleading conclusions drawn from the similarities of population size or pace of economic growth of the two countries. Without ignoring the existence of several channels of cooperation or seeking to minimise the importance of considerable achievements realised in recent years by the two governments towards normalising their relations, this article argues that pragmatism will prevail on both sides of the Himalayas. The first part of the article shows that the historical baggage of bilateral relations dominated by suspicion and conflict is far from being jettisoned, and that a number of problems that led the two sides to a military conflict still remain despite the altered regional and global geopolitical context. In the second part, devoted to economic matters, the article shows that the potential for strategic cooperation is limited to a few areas, whereas the economic rivalry between two countries is much greater and is unlikely to diminish in intensity or in the number of contentious issues in the coming years.
S us pi cions a nd g e ost ra te g ic r iv a lr ie s i n b il at er al r el a tions
The war that China unleashed on 20 October 1962 -while the world's attention was focused on the "Cuban Missile Crisis " between the United States and the Soviet Unionlasted a mere 30 days, (9) but it continues to haunt BeijingNew Delhi relations nearly half a century later. Quite apart from the territorial differences over recognising the McMahon line (10) and the question of which side was responsible for sparking the war, (11) geopolitical tensions of a more general nature have persisted since the 1950s, despite transformations in the regional and international contexts. Moreover, the alliance between Pakistan and China, and India's backing of the Dalai Lama, continue to weigh heavily on Sino-Indian ties.
The clash of two nationalisms and rivalries for Asian leadership
We'll start with a review of the geopolitical tensions that dogged Beijing-New Delhi ties in the 1950s: The rivalrynever officially expressed -between India and China to head the movement of developing countries seeking to keep some independence vis à vis the United States and the Soviet Union contributed greatly to the deterioration in Beijing-New Delhi relations. Right from 1927, well before India's independence, Nehru had in a speech to the All India Congress Committee (the central decision-making body of the Congress party) referred to the role of India and China in fighting imperialism and promoting non-alignment. (12) As is widely known, neutrality and peaceful coexistence became the pivot of India's foreign policy after independence. The democratic character of Indian polity and Nehru's aura on the international scene helped India project itself as the natural leader of the non-aligned movement, provoking jealousy and irritation among Beijing's Communist leaders. Several analyses of the causes behind the 1962 war attribute to China the desire to "teach a lesson" to Nehru and curtail India's ambitions of becoming a leader of nonaligned countries, especially in Asia. The question of leadership of the newly decolonising Asian non-aligned countries was thus already an issue that pitted the two countries against each other in the 1950s. China had not been recognised by the United Nations, and while the two countries' internal economic situations allowed neither to project political influence in Asia, unambiguous international recognition helped Nehru's India assume a role in Asia that China, immersed in its own political turmoil, was quite incapable of playing. The war China unleashed consciously shattered Nehru's foreign policy ambitions for India. By forcing India to seek US military aid to counter the Chinese troops amassing in strength along the Assam plains, (13) China exposed the limits of the non-alignment pol-
icy Nehru touted. US military aid was extended on 20 November 1962 as the conflict was ending, and not without criticism from American political circles, which rebuked Nehru's lack of gratitude for America's food aid and his refusal to align New Delhi's position with Washington's against Communism. (14) The conflict exposed to the world at large India's military and tactical failures in the face of China's determination and solidity. Nehru and his defence minister V. K. Krishna Menon became the butt of bitter and pointed attacks from the Indian political class, who considered them guilty of failing to perceive the extent of the Chinese threat. Nehru emerged from the conflict greatly weakened on both the foreign and domestic fronts: he had never believed war was imminent, despite repeated Chinese aggressions and warnings from Indian intelligence agencies. On the one hand Nehru seemed disturbed by the gathering diplomatic and military tensions in the Himalayas from the mid-1950s, but at the same time he believed that China, as a developing country concerned over its own diplomatic non-aligned independence and having suffered under colonial powers, would not launch an aggression against India. Many analysts attribute to then-defence minister V. K. Krishna Menon a portion of the blame for India's defeat. But it was, in the final analysis, Nehru who refused until the end to believe a Chinese attack was imminent. This was to a large extent the reason for the Indian troops' lack of preparedness. By the time the last-chance conciliation meeting with Zhou failed in November 1960, it was already too late for the Indian army, which was ill-prepared in a region that posed logistical challenges due to its difficult access. 
It is worth noting that the border issue has become a kind of barometer of bilateral ties. Despite the thaw in relations, New Delhi and Beijing are still blowing hot and cold over the settlement of the border dispute, a function of evolution in the most important bilateral issues. The Indo-US rapprochement, especially on the civilian nuclear issue (see below), has led to a series of statements on China's part with regard to the border dispute. The most astoundingthough it merely reiterated a known Chinese stand -was that of the then Chinese ambassador Sun Yuxi, shortly after President Hu Jintao's India trip. The envoy said in November 2006 in a televised interview that Arunachal Pradesh belonged to China, drawing a predictably furious response from India. (22) On the Chinese side the border dispute is largely a geostrategic security issue of little concern to the public in comparison with attitudes toward Japan and Taiwan; on the Indian side, however, the 1962 humiliation left a great deal of nationalism and emotion invested. Failing a strong Chinese gesture, the Indian side will have only limited elbow room in negotiations. As for rivalry over Asian leadership, economic and diplomatic clout has turned the wheel largely in Beijing's favour. China has a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and its rapid economic development has led to active diplomacy with Asian countries since the mid-1990s. A recent article by Tarique Niazi points out that China has built a network of control over the Indian sphere of influence in Asia through its tentacles in ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, (23) and also through its highly active 
Moreover, China has developed naval cooperation with many Asian countries to form a "pearl necklace" (in the Chinese media's words) in South and Southeast Asia through the establishment of a series of permanent military bases to secure energy supplies.
(25) Some of these bases, such as those in Chittagong in Bangladesh, Coco Islands in Myanmar, Habantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, and Gwadar in Pakistan, are very much in India's maritime "zone of influence." Faced with all these actions on China's part, India has responded by obtaining dialogue partner status with ASEAN and observer status in the SCO, and launching some regional initiatives such as the "Mekong Ganga Cooperation" (26) in Nov 2000. Despite this Indian counteroffensive, China clearly dominates the diplomatic game of spheres of influence. India hasn't renounced its ambitions for Asian leadership, however. Nearly a half century after Nehru's death, and in an Asia transformed in the economic and political spheres, India continues, rightly or wrongly, to believe that its demographic weight, democratic values, and more recent economic dynamism could help it play a major role on the Asian stage. This hasn't gone unnoticed in Beijing, and the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia continues to fuel mutual suspicion comparable to that between France and Prussia in Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. For now, Beijing enjoys a clear advantage. The last issue that is symptomatic of this geostrategic rivalry concerns India's aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Beijing has blown hot and cold over the issue, never officially setting out a clear position. On 30 May 2008, during a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) summit at Yekaterinburg in Russia, China refused to sign a Russian-drafted final communiqué backing India's candidature. This refusal has been interpreted to mean either a change in China's position or its pursuit of a policy of control over the Indian sphere of influence. The handling of an issue so dear to India shows a deep chasm in the way of bilateral strategic cooperation. (28) China, which had been aware for some days that it had achieved its aims and couldn't sustain a more ambitious invasion into Indian territory, declared a unilateral ceasefire (29) and retreated from a good part of the territory conquered during the month-long war. The mission to militarily secure its south-west border had been realised. The Sino-Pakistan alliance, which had strengthened since 1963, helped Beijing complete the process in the south-west. Nehru's death in 1964, and the drift under his daughter, Indira Gandhi, towards populist socialism internally as well towards the Soviet Union externally, gradually distanced India from the United States. The elevation of Indo-Soviet India (a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -NPT) allowing inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its nuclear energy production sites, (31) along with a moratorium on nuclear tests. In exchange, India would gain access to US nuclear technology, ending 34 years of embargo on trade in nuclear material following India's first test in 1974.
(32) More generally, the agreement would allow India to officially enter the select group of nuclear powers while remaining outside of the NPT. The accord with the US required approval by the Indian Parliament, followed by the IAEA, the 45-nation nuclear suppliers group, and finally US Congress. The first hurdle in the process affecting Indo-US ties was crossed with some difficulty. After a nine-month delay in schedule, and a bitter debate, India's ruling Congress party secured parliamentary assent on 22 July 2008, (33) thanks to backing from some small parties and independents and the abstention of some opposition MPs. This result came about despite the defection of the Communists (mainly members the Communist Party of India-Marxist), who had been backing the government from the outside. The delay fuelled criticism in the United States of India's inability to keep its word and the reluctance of its political class to seek a genuine rapprochement with Washington. Nevertheless, many observers insisted that the difficulties faced in the process of getting the deal approved by Indian MPs would temper the zeal of 2005, and it would be possible to envisage a more realistic and pragmatic Indo-US relationship.
(34) More generally and beyond the nuclear issue, there have been extensive ideological departures in both the United States and India over the last few years on the question of bilateral ties. Washington has decided to pay serious attention to New Delhi's political, military, and economic weight in the region and to integrate it in strategic action plans for Asian security.
(35) On the Indian side, both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress have worked for rapprochement with the United States since early this decade.
(36) This change has been reflected in a clear increase in bilateral cooperation in the strategic, military (joint exercises in the Indian Ocean), and economic domains. While on the Chinese side the effort is to limit the effects of strategic and military encirclement, on the Indian side the rapprochement with the United States is aimed at directly limiting Chinese influence in Asia. One analyst of India's foreign policy put it this way:
More than the sops offered by the United States, it is the stick being wielded by China that is powering the current Indian sprint toward a substantive strategic partnership with the United States, one that can only affect China's interests in Asia negatively. The Himalayan chill now enveloping Sino-Indian (37) ties is creating summer warmth in India's relations with the other superpower, the United States. (38) This profound and lasting change in Indo-US ties has not escaped the attention of Beijing, which first fiercely attacked the nuclear accord, (39) then sought to counter the American "charm offensive" in India by dangling the possibility of sig- The announcement of this proposal in November 2006 has yet to be followed up by any tangible move on Beijing's part. Although many in the Chinese military were hesitant about the gesture, Beijing may have hoped that the announcement of a potential cooperation would boost the numbers of Indian MPs opposed to the Indo-US nuclear agreement. China was also aware that the mere announcement of such a proposal could ignite "India sceptics" in Washington.
(41) Since the US-India agreement was signed in 2005, many in Washington have questioned the usefulness of US attempts to forge a strategic partnership with a country that does not wish to make the slightest changes to its policy of non-alignment, and which would remain, as during the Nehru and Indira Gandhi years, insensitive to US strategic initiatives. The 22 July 2008 vote in the Indian parliament backing the nuclear accord with the United States appears to have calmed the waters in Washington and frustrated Beijing's attempts to destabilise the Congress party by stoking a defection of its Communist allies. The next three hurdles were crossed without great ado: The IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rapidly gave their green lights after the Indian parliament vote, and the agreement gained the approval of the US Congress on 1 October 2008. Beijing will henceforth be in a more uncomfortable position in countering the strategic repercussions of the Indo-US rapprochement. All the same, Beijing could decide to cooperate earnestly with India so that the United States does not become India's only and privileged partner in nuclear issues. Engaging in nuclear cooperation with India would also help Beijing test New Delhi's non-aligned credentials. And being "courted" by both Washington and Beijing on the issue, New Delhi might be tempted to play them off each other for higher stakes. However, keeping equidistant ties with Washington and Beijing and pursuing non-alignment would be a difficult balancing act for New Delhi. The United States would need some proof and gestures of exclusive loyalty from India in order to subdue Washington sceptics. Any perception in Washington that New Delhi was trying to play the big powers against each other could recoil and discredit India (as in the past) in its role of new Asian strategic partner. This "ménage à trois," which is clearly transforming strategic relations in Asia in a deep and abiding way, could have surprises in store. Beijing holds many advantages -close ties with Pakistan, weight in the UN, special relations with ASEAN, and economic might in the region -to counter India's influence. But as the nuclear issue has clearly shown, after a 30-year hiatus, China's fears of containment through warming Indo-US ties could again become a crucial factor in Sino-Indian ties. This development can only exacerbate feelings of suspicion and pragmatism on both sides.
The Tibet issue
The Dalai Lama had considered requesting political asylum as early as 1956, when he was part of the official Chinese delegation during Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to India. SinoIndian relations were then in fine fettle. In an agreement signed with China in April 1954, India had officially recognised that Tibet belonged to China, and Nehru had signalled to the Dalai Lama that he did not wish to interfere in Sino-Tibetan affairs for fear of annoying the Chinese government. But by the time the Dalai Lama crossed the border in March 1959 and sought refuge in India, SinoIndian ties had already begun unravelling. China's construction in 1957 of roads for transporting military supplies to its borders with India, the publication of maps in 1958 claiming a part of Ladakh as Chinese territory, the exchange of letters between Nehru and Zhou in which the Chinese leader said in 1958 that Beijing did not recognise the McMahon line, and the first skirmishes along the border, had already led to deterioration of relations. The revolt by the Khampas in late 1958 was ruthlessly put down by the Chinese army, further convincing the Dalai Lama that his situation in Lhasa had become precarious. In this context of hostility with China, the Indian government this time accepted the Dalai Lama's request. His arrival in India in late March 1959 further vitiated Sino-Indian ties. In an interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow in October 1960, Zhou Enlai said the boundary dispute "came to the fore" after "the Dalai Lama had run away." He accused India of wanting to "turn China's Tibet region into a 'buffer zone.'" He said: "They don't want Tibet to become a Socialist Tibet, as had other places in China," and that "the Indian side ... is using the Sino-Indian boundary question as a card against progressive forces at home and as capital for obtaining 'foreign aid.'" (42) Nearly a half century after the Dalai Lama's arrival in India, the Tibet issue continues to bedevil bilateral ties. 
The Sino-Indian modus operandi over Tibet remains fragile. Although the Indian authorities periodically pull up the Dalai Lama when he uses his Dharamsala headquarters for political activities to which China objects, he enjoys free movement in and out of India and manages to irritate the Chinese on a regular basis.
(44) Despite the arrest of some Tibetans for staging "anti-China" activities on Indian soil, (45) the Indian authorities have allowed demonstrations in many major cities, and the foreign ministry shed its reticence for once in calling for negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities and a non-violent resolution of the troubles in Tibet. 
(48) Although the amount of China's military aid to Pakistan is quite difficult to estimate, given the secrecy that surrounds it, Western sources believe it to be among the most comprehensive and substantial that the People's Republic has supplied to any country since 1949. More generally, although Sino-Pakistani relations have had to gradually adapt to the thaw in Sino-Indian ties, (52) Pakistan remains a highly strategic card in China's foreign policy "game" in the region. A realignment with India or even a balancing act favouring New Delhi appears highly unlikely. Beijing may well deny it, but the fact remains that Pakistan remains a cat's paw limiting India's moves on the regional chessboard: the links between Pakistan's intelligence agencies and Islamic militants impeding a resolution of the Kashmir dispute (among other problems), military rivalry with India, communal conflicts between Hindus and Muslims that poisons Indian polity, the paralysis in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation caused by the Indo-Pakistan rivalry, and the access China has gained to Pakistan through the Strait of Hormuz, all constitute destabilising factors for India and will restrain its influence in the region. Moreover, China also enjoys a privileged entry into the Muslim world via Pakistan. Finally, the Indo-Pakistan rivalry allows China to keep its military presence relatively limited on its south-west flank. Despite the transformations in its relations with the United States and Russia, China must still ensure the security of its 22,722 kilometres of borders (the world's longest border, even exceeding Russia's) with 14 countries, including the 4,057 kilometre boundary with India (China's third longest after those with Mongolia and Russia). Moreover, China's Taiwan policy and the US military presence in Japan and South Korea preclude the concentration of too much military might in one border area. For all these reasons, Sino-Pakistan relations can be expected to take precedence over Sino-Indian ties. As for New Delhi, although more and more voices call for a reasonable and rational view of Sino-Pakistan ties, (53) the fact remains that the relationship is largely seen as a strategic alliance shrouded in secrecy and mainly aimed against India.
B eyo nd co mp le m ent ar iti es i n e co nom ic re la tio ns A window -dressing pact between the "world's workshop" and the "world's back office"
Among the analyses touting the potential for strategic economic cooperation between China and India, the alliance between the "world's back office" (India) and the "world's workshop" (China) is certainly one that has captured the imagination of many people. During a visit to India's "Silicon Valley," Bangalore, in April 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao went so far as to compare cooperation to "two pagodas, one hardware and one software; combined, we can take the leadership position in the world. When the particular day comes, it will signify the coming of the Asian century of the IT industry." (54) Nevertheless the question arises as to how this specialisation in two different segments of the information industry, and more generally between two economic sectors (manufacturing in China and services in India, see Graphic 1), could induce greater bilateral cooperation. Few factors favour a deeper industrial cooperation between the two sides beyond superficial complementarities. Firstly, cooperation would require each side to renounce over the long term the development on its soil of the segment in which it holds the lesser advantage, both absolute and comparative (in the sense David Ricardo meant). The current industrial policies of the two governments, as well the decisions of companies in each country, show a trend in exactly the opposite direction. Over the past few years, the two sides have, with varying degrees of success, striven to 
Similarly, India has taken measures to narrow the gap in the industrial domain. Indian companies have made increasing incursions into industrial sectors in which China enjoys a clear advantage in terms of economies of scale, export volume, and mastery of mass production techniques. (56) This is the case in sectors such as automobiles, textiles (which in fact have suffered less from competition with China than initially feared with the termination of export quotas to developed countries in 2005), (57) heavy industry (chemicals and steel), and more recently in the production of hardware for the information industry. These incursions have benefited from policies to protect India's domestic industry more in the home market than in exports. In terms of exports, especially textiles, Indian producers have found some niche markets in which they avoid direct competition with Chinese exports.
(58) Many projections also indicate that should the Indian government pursue a targeted liberalisation of foreign trade (reduction of import duties on intermediate products used in export production and lowering of transport costs), Indian industry could repeat the experience of China during the 1990s in benefiting from integration into the international division of labour through openness to more foreign direct investment and quickly develop a position of strength in manufacturing manpower. This would be all the more likely if India were to reform its labour laws (which currently restrict unskilled labour movement in the organised sector). Given India's demography -up until 2050 it will have an expanding active population younger than China's -the country will be in increasingly direct competition with China in manufacturing.
(59)
Without waiting to realise these projections in the medium to long term, the Indian government has shown through its inaction on a Chinese proposal for a free trade agreement (FTA) that it has no desire to abandon those sectors in which China excels. First proposed by China in 2004, and broached every time Chinese leaders visited India, the FTA suggestion was rejected by both the BJP and Congress when in power.
(60) A protectionist dimension is certainly evident in this refusal, notably pressure from the Indian business lobby (such as the Confederation of Indian Industry) against the agreement, but it also shows the government's desire to protect its industry from Chinese manufacturers and develop on the strength of the immense domestic market. India certainly needs to reform several elements of its trade and investment regimes. In fact, it has to find an appropriate balance, as China has done, between a "developmentalist" desire and the need to open itself to foreign presence and thus better integrate with the global economy. More generally, China's domestic market is as large as India's. Unlike countries with small populations that need to (61) or Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, this was the policy China followed in the 1980s and 1990s before agreeing to significantly reduce tariffs in order to gain entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. At the same time, China continues to maintain non-tariff barriers, to the chagrin of industrialised countries, in order to nurture a wide range of industries and services on its soil. A recent study showed that in India, too, many industrial sectors have gained a considerable international comparative advantage in the space of a few years.
(62) It should be stated here that if the day dawns when China and India dominate manufacturing or services, it will almost certainly take place in the context of competition, and not in the framework of a complementary partnership. Secondly, even if current complementarities in economic activities (or trade) persist, they will not necessarily lead to closer industrial or technological cooperation between the two countries. The example of Japan and China shows this quite clearly. Despite rapid increases in trade -Japan is China's second largest trade partner after the EU -and the existence of complementarities in economic activities, the two countries have nevertheless failed to develop a strategic partnership in the technological or industrial sectors. Indeed, such partnerships are an exception rather than a rule in contemporary international economic relations generally. Technological and industrial cooperation among the EU countries was preceded and accompanied by a process of political integration that is unique in economic history today. It is also worth mentioning the great access enjoyed by Japanese and then Korean and Taiwanese firms to US technology following World War II. This cooperation was largely motivated by geopolitical considerations linked to the defence of American interests and the development of a "capitalist front" during the Cold War.
(63) These countries were also within the US military's sphere of influence in the post-war period, which helped facilitate such cooperation until the 1970s. Once the Cold War ended, the United States demanded greater access for its products to the domestic markets of these countries, and the dismantling of non-competitive practices (including the links among industrial groups and banks such as the Keireitsu in Japan and the Korean Chaebols), while imposing much stricter controls, even restrictions, on the transfer of technologies to companies in these countries. (64) China-India ties fit neither the political integration model nor that of military protection or domination. It is therefore highly likely that current complementarities in economic structures will not lead to closer technological and industrial cooperation, but rather to more "conventional" progress in trade and investment exchanges, which in itself would be a great improvement over the past. Thus the presence of firms such as China's Huawei in Bangalore or Tata Consulting in Pudong (65) must be viewed with prudence and sobriety. China has become a formidable market globally. The growth in demand for information technology services on the part of Chinese firms as well as multinationals installed in China is such that it would be suicidal for Indian companies that lead in this domain not to boost their presence in China, all the more so as a number of multinationals that have been long-term clients of Indian firms have gained a major presence in China and continue to require servicing by Indian companies in the framework of traditional software sub-contracting. In India, Chinese companies have sought to increase their presence since early this decade as part of a process of rapid multi-nationalisation. This is as imperative for them as it is for their Indian, Western, or Japanese counterparts. They have to strengthen and diversify their acquisition of technological competence or risk losing out not only to global competition but also within a domestic market that has opened under WTO membership. The firms have to "source" their technologies in the major world centres. As Bangalore and Hyderabad have emerged as two such centres, it would be normal for Chinese firms to establish bases there and seek out cooperation with leading Indian companies specialising in information technologies. The Wipro-Huawei joint ven- china perspectives ture that began in 2002 in the field of telecom routers is no different from the numerous commercial tie-ups between Indian firms and those from the United States, Europe, or Japan based in Bangalore or Hyderabad. The fact of it being a Sino-Indian JV is noteworthy as a "first" following a long freeze in the political and economic ties between New Delhi and Beijing. But in no way does it signal the development of closer bilateral strategic technological and industrial cooperation as some analysts suggest.
Current complement arities and future competition in trade relations
As Table 2 shows, bilateral trade, which was almost nonexistent until the 1990s ($260 million in 1991), has grown rapidly since early this decade 
Research by M.S. Qureshi and Wan Guanghua (68) into the foreign trade structures of both countries shows that the rapid rise in bilateral exchanges can be explained by increasing complementarities between India and China in recent years. To summarize, India mainly exports raw materials to China, which for its part ships mostly manufactured goods to India. Rapid economic growth in both countries, and the "reserves of complementarities" in products traded, increase the likelihood of rapid bilateral exchanges in the years to come, the authors say. India, for instance, has strong potential for increasing exports of leather and inorganic chemicals to China.
(69) At the same time, China is capable of boosting its exports of telecommunication products and computers to India. Similarly, there is potential for intersectoral growth in steel, organic, and inorganic chemicals, as well as machinery. 
There are, nevertheless, many potential roadblocks to this expansion in bilateral trade, some of which could ignite trade disputes. The first is linked to the nature of Indian exports to China, mostly agricultural raw materials and minerals. Supplies of these natural resources are not unlimited, and given its domestic needs, India could be forced to limit the export of some products to China. This already occurred in July 2008 when Chinese importers, who had greatly boosted their imports of Indian iron ore, were faced with a new 15 percent tax on export of the raw material, which the government in New Delhi imposed in order to ensure adequate supplies to domestic steelworks. It would not be surprising if such protectionist measures multiply in India, given the enormous demand for mineral resources in China and the corresponding exponential demand from India's own industry. Table 2 ), or 11 percent of India's total trade deficit. (73) This projection (on a static model without accounting for comparative advantages) and many other sectoral studies show that without a major improvement in the competitiveness of Indian goods, any simultaneous and proportional reduction in tariffs by Beijing and New Delhi would lead to a far higher increase in exports from China to India than in the other direction.
(74) It is therefore understandable that the Indian business lobby favours the status quo and the Indian government has dragged its feet on an FTA with China. As part of an FTA, if India's trade imbalance with China worsened, sections of Indian industry could suffer a serious competitive disadvantage, given the proportion of manufactured goods among China's exports to India. At a time when India is trying to play catch-up in industry, competition from China, which already poses problems for some sectors at current tariff levels, (75) could further threaten takeoff plans should an FTA be implemented. It is thus not surprising that India has joined a number of other countries in refusing to grant market economy status to China in the WTO framework. By doing so, India is able to take steps to protect its market when it believes Chinese producers are "dumping" goods through prices depressed by their socialist heritage and disregard for laws such as those governing minimum wage and environmental protection. In short, the rapid rise in exchanges is an encouraging and positive sign of warming Sino-Indian relations. It also ends the aberrant situation of what until early in this decade was a ridiculously tiny trade volume, given the rate of economic growth in the two countries, their physical proximity and the structural complementarities of their economies. However, as the example of Sino-Japanese ties shows, growing trade exchanges do not equate to strategic economic cooperation. Moreover, the sharp rise in trade could potentially bring an imbalance for India that could lead to disputes with China. Therefore India is most likely to continue protecting its industry and raw materials vis à vis China, which for its part is unlikely to be content with its current strong position in trade, but will keep pushing for an opening of India's domestic market to its goods. Tensions and conflicts are thus likely to accompany soaring bilateral trade. P a ra ll el a nd co mp e titi ve ques ts f o r new s ourc es of ra w m at er ia l
In January 2006, when Mani Shankar Aiyar, then minister for petroleum and natural gas, signed an agreement during an official trip to China, many analysts and commentators enthusiastically endorsed an energy alliance between the two sides.
(76) The agreement envisages extensive cooperation in the fields of oil and gas prospecting, refining, and distribution, and promotion of alternative energy. Above all, the two countries wished to express their willingness to eschew (78) and Colombia, (79) and more recently in the supply of equipment for electricity generation. (80) The idea of two economic giants and new entrants on the international energy chessboard getting together to take on major US, European, and Japanese companies on their favourite hunting grounds of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Central Asia, was no doubt a seductive one for many observers. Nevertheless, as in other areas of bilateral exchanges, the extent of Sino-Indian cooperation in the field of energy seems to have been greatly exaggerated. First of all, an analysis of the behaviour of Indian and Chinese firms shows that the relationship is more typically characterized by often brutal competition. Since 2004, Indian firms in direct competition with Chinese companies have lost a series of bids for oil projects in Angola, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and Myanmar.
(81) In a much rarer instance of an Indian firm upstaging a Chinese firm with much greater experience in this field, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL, the foreign operations arm of ONGC) outbid SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) to acquire Imperial Energy, a British firm that controlled parts of oil projects in Russia and Kazakhstan, for $2.6 billion. (82) How could competition be avoided when securing foreign energy supplies has become a key national priority for both giants? During the first half of this century, India and China will remain largely dependent on coal, which they have in large quantities within their territories.
(83) Their dependence on external sources for oil and gas is expected to continue increasing sharply if both countries keep growing at the rate they have in recent years. The International Energy Agency projects that India's dependence on foreign energy sources will rise from 73 percent (in 2006) to 91.6 percent by 2020. In China, which was energy self-sufficient until the mid-1990s, dependence on foreign sources is expected to rise to 50 percent in 2010 and to 77 percent in 2030. (84) Thus the two countries' national independence relies in part on access to new foreign energy sources. This increasing demand for hydrocarbons comes at time of great uncertainty on the global oil scene. As latecomers, China and India are not finding it easy to take on the major oil giants, who have dominated the industry for more than a century with remarkable stability. Whatever might be said of their exploits in Africa, reports of which have eaten up acres of newsprint in recent years, Chinese and Indian firms are forced to make astronomical bids to gain entry into areas where Western and Japanese companies have traditionally held dominance. India and China have also had to deal with countries deemed untouchable (albeit only in recent years) by Western and Japanese firms for political reasons. Beijing and New Delhi appear to be less worried about moral arguments (as indeed Western governments had been until recently), but this type of cooperation is not without political cost, as demonstrated by the criticisms hurled at China over its role in the Darfur crisis. (85) Sudan accounts for six percent and five percent, respectively, of China's and India's foreign oil supplies, (86) and the Sudanese government has granted 40 percent of the exploitation rights of its oilfields to China, 30 percent to Malaysia, and 25 percent to India. (87) The Chinese government has been accused of closing its eyes to the Darfur crisis and of economically sustaining the Khartoum regime, which has faced several critical votes in the United Nations. In early 2008, in the run-up to the Olympics in Beijing, Chinese diplomats were forced to shed their reticence and address mounting international criticism over their role in
Sudan. (88) In Burma, the military, economic, and diplomatic support given to the military regime by China and India in exchange for the exploitation of natural gas resources has also drawn fierce criticism from around the world. Sino-Indian competition is not limited to hydrocarbons; it is equally fierce in the quest for other raw materials both countries lack. Phosphates, iron ore, nickel, lead, scrap iron, aluminium, leather, zinc, and tungsten (despite major domestic resources of these in China's case) are the subject of intense competition, not only between China and India, but also among other big countries. (89) Finally, even when large Indian and Chinese energy groups decide to collaborate, there is nothing to indicate that these projects would be conducted in the framework of a strategic and special relationship at the expense of their cooperation with other countries. On the contrary, an analysis of the foreign cooperative ties of the two countries' oil and gas giants shows that their links to European, American, Russian, Japanese, Saudi, and Australian companies and to major developing countries such as Brazil, Chile, Iran, and Venezuela are much longer, more numerous, and sustained. As of late 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) had signed 182 contracts and agreements in the oil domain with 76 companies from 21 countries.
(90) Shell, Exxon, Chevron, and Total are CNOOC's major partners, far ahead of any Indian companies. Of CNOOC's 50 oilfields offshore of China, 27 are exploited jointly with foreign companies, but no Indian firm was among them as of late 2006. The same situation pertains with regard to the other oil and gas giant, SINOPEC: no Indian firm figures among its strategic partners, while the company enjoys close cooperation with major Western multinationals in both exploitation and commercialisation.
(91) Similarly, there is no indication that China firms are about to overtake the cooperation Indian companies have established with Western and Japanese companies or those from other developing countries. ONGC Videsh, for instance, has much closer links to Brazil's Petrobras, having signed a series of strategic agreements in 2007.
(92) Agreements signed with CNPC or SINOPEC are in no way exclusive or different from many others that ONGC Videsh has signed with foreign partners since early this decade.
(93) The same holds true for the Indian private group Reliance.
(94) Sino-Indian cooperation in energy is thus devoid of any exclusivity: the importance of recent joint projects they have launched are put in perspective by the older and more sustained ties both sides maintain with other countries. China and India have treated each other as potential alliance partners in recent years for specific projects in the same way as they have other state and private actors on the world energy scene. Given these facts, it is clear that despite the implementation of a few joint projects in hydrocarbons since 2005, the two countries are far from forging a strategic relationship in energy and raw materials. Cooperation between Chinese and Indian firms appears for now to be more the exception than the rule as the two engage in ruthless competition to secure new foreign energy supplies. 
• Farm subsidies in developed countries, especially EU member-states; • "Special products" that allow developing countries flexibility by according the right to protect national producers judged to be supplying goods crucial for food security and rural development; • Special safeguard mechanisms to allow developing countries to temporarily increase protectionist duties on some basic farm products such as wheat and rice so as to protect their farmers during a time of rapid rise in imports; • Developed countries' wish to include some minimum social and trade union conditions in the WTO framework; • The possibility of defending fisheries in developing countries through subsidies authorised in the WTO framework; • Finally, the degree and speed of opening of the services sector in developing countries. As a newcomer in the WTO, China kept a low profile in the Doha Round. Nevertheless, Beijing clearly aligned itself with New Delhi's stand on each of the issues, letting India play the leader's role during ministerial conferences. China also weighed in to back India at crucial moments in the negotiations. For instance, during the last ministerial of the Doha Round at Geneva on 29 July 2008, China's support for India was crucial after Brazil defected and positioned itself behind the developed countries. In April 2007, during a meeting in Beijing between Commerce Minister Bo Xilai and his Indian counterpart, Kamal Nath, the two sides issued a joint declaration voicing a strong common position in defence of developing countries' interests. (96) China and India have also defended shared stands in international negotiations on climate change, especially as regards the establishment of rules that will take effect by the end of the first stage, i.e. 2012, as envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol. The two countries have made common cause over the past several years, affirming this entente forcefully at the last Climate Change Conference in Bali in December 2007 (97) by rejecting all attempts by developed countries (except the United States) to impose quotas on the emission of greenhouse gases. The two countries also joined hands to reject the principle (proposed notably by France) of a tax on imports of products from countries that have high rates of greenhouse gas emissions. China and India also jointly proposed the setting up of a fund financed by countries "historically" responsible for the greenhouse effect (United States and Europe) to help fund innovations and technology transfers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Seeing the impact of such alliances between India and China, several analysts have spoken of a new era in international economic organisations, especially the WTO. Unthinkable only 15 years ago, given the state of their bilateral ties and China's limited participation in international economic organisations, such alliances could be repeated in future and could change the current power equations in international negotiations. Nevertheless, such China-India alliances can be expected to be limited to specific issues and remain pragmatic, and are unlikely to lead to the formation of a systematic axis for defending developing countries. The numerous geostrategic rivalries examined in the first part of this paper limit the extent of such alliances, which are still largely dictated by specific convergences linked to the defence of national interests and limited to some economic issues. The lack of alliance between the two countries on other matters, such as the reform of the United Nations and the IMF, was demonstrated by China's attitude toward India's aspirations to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
Concl usion
In analysing various facets of Sino-Indian relations, the effort here has been to show that behind the media and official hyperbole over warming diplomatic and economic ties since the early 1990s, the bilateral process remains entangled in a series of geostrategic and economic rivalries. Beijing-New Delhi relations continue to be dogged by mutual suspicion inherited from the 1962 war, itself the result of the clash of mutually irreconcilable nationalisms and ambitions toward the Asian scene. In 1959, i.e. three years before the start of the war, Jawaharlal Nehru had told Edgar Snow in an interview that "the basic reason for the Sino-Indian dispute was that they were both 'new nations' in that both were newly independent and under dynamic nationalistic leaderships, and in a sense were 'meeting' at their frontiers for the first time in history." (98) The Indian historian Ramachandra Guha takes this further, insisting that the India-China conflict "was a clash of national myths, national egos, national 
The geopolitical context has of course changed greatly today, but the clash of two nationalisms on the Asian scene continues to influence Sino-Indian relations. Some underlying tensions felt during the 1950s, such as competition for Asian leadership, and Beijing's fear of military containment and of a US-India alliance, continue to weigh heavily on bilateral ties today. The 1950s also left behind heavy baggage in the form of the Tibet issue, boundary demarcation, and SinoPakistan relations. India's military defeat in 1962 has remained one of the greatest national humiliations of independent India. It also completely destroyed the capital of confidence placed in the neighbouring country by Nehru, one of the fathers of modern India, and exposed the contradictions and limits of India's pursuit of the policy of non-alignment. Nearly half a century later, the shockwaves of that war have yet to wane in India's political and military establishment. Every time tensions increase between the two counties, the past rises up to haunt the spirits of Indian leaders. A relationship based on pragmatism is the best that can emerge from this loaded and complex heritage and its three decades of "freeze." As the above analysis indicates, Beijing-New Delhi ties today are subjected more to tensions that pit them against each other than joint projects that bring them closer together. Normalisation of relations does not, therefore, imply the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership; the hypothesis according to which development of bilateral exchanges help sweep away rivalries, tensions, and mutual suspicions appears to lack credibility. As Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research has said about Sino-Japanese ties, "200 billion dollars' bilateral trade between China and Japan do not guarantee moderation and restraint in bilateral relations when strategic animosities remain unresolved." (100) The "gentle commerce" between people and nations, so dear to Montesquieu and Adam Smith, today helps China and India to (re)discover each other, (101) and to act together on specific issues in some matters of energy and environment and in the WTO framework. But that does not amount to a magic wand that will wish away the numerous problems that currently weigh down bilateral relations, as well as both countries' hegemonistic ambitions in Asia. In other words, India and China are well on the way to changing the world.
(102) But they do so separately, through the emergence of their respective economic and military might, rather than through a strategic partnership, which for the moment remains more a pious declaration than a reality. • 
